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Abstract 
The textbook competitive model of drug markets predicts that greater law enforcement leads to 
higher black market prices, but also to the unintended consequences of greater revenue and 
violence.  These predictions are not in accord with the paradoxical outcomes evinced by recent 
history in some drug markets, where enforcement rose even as prices fell.  We show that 
predictions of the textbook model are not unequivocal, and that when bandwagon effects 
among scofflaws are introduced, the simple predictions are more likely to be reversed.  We next 
show that even simple models of noncompetitive black markets can elicit paradoxical outcomes.  
Therefore, we argue that instead of searching for assumptions that lead to paradoxical 
outcomes, which is the direction the literature has taken, it is better for policy analysis to choose 
appropriate assumptions for the textbook model.  We finish with performing such an analysis for 
the case of banning menthol cigarettes.  Under the most plausible assumptions enforcement will 
indeed spur violence, although the legal availability of electronic cigarettes may mitigate or 
reverse this conclusion. 
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I. Introduction 
The problem of violence in black markets for prohibited goods has vexed 
policymakers in the United States at least since Prohibition.  While violence may be 
endemic in markets for any illegal or smuggled good, illicit drugs provide a prime example 
of the relationships between banning sale of a good and violence.  Illicit drug markets are 
prone to violence because the high value of the illegal goods, coupled with the lack of 
recourse to the legal system to settle conflicts, creates instabilities, uncertainties, and 
distrust in the market (Miron and Zwiebel, 1995; Andreas and Wallman, 2009).  This is 
exacerbated by illicit-market participants’ pre-existing experiences with violence; 
participants tend to be recruited from communities with above-average rates of violence 
(Moeller and Hesse, 2013).1   
If violence stems from trafficking in illicit drugs, then it may seem that enforcement 
of laws against trafficking should reduce violent crime.  However, both practical experience 
and economic theory show that enforcement against illegal activity in drug markets may 
have the unintended consequence of exacerbating violence.  Systematic reviews of the 
empirical literature show that nearly all studies find evidence of an adverse impact of drug 
law enforcement on levels of violence (Werb et al., 2011; Hawken, Kulick, and Prieger, 
2013).  The theoretical literature offers a number of explanations for why stricter 
enforcement targeting illicit drug markets might increase violence.  To begin with, 
increased enforcement disrupts the market.  Destabilizing established hierarchies renews 
competition, and violence can follow as participants jostle for exclusive territory (“turf”) 
                                                          
1 As Reuter (1991) points out, “a business involving large sums of cash and valuable commodities, staffed by 
young, poorly educated males, operating outside the law, is one in which violence is likely to be an important 
method for settling the numerous disputes that inevitably arise.” 
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and market share (Rasmussen and Benson, 1994; Costa Storti and De Grauwe, 2008; 
Papachristos, 2009) and try to deter entry (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000).  Furthermore, 
stricter enforcement increases the risk of detection and punishment, which in turn 
increases the risk premium and therefore profitability of sales (Kuziemko and Levitt, 
2004).  Revenue becomes worth fighting for: Increasing the share of total cost attributed to 
enforcement risk can increase the incentive for violence, because violence may deter 
enforcement agencies and potential informants (Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick, 2010; 
Kleiman, 2011).  A third economic argument postulates that prohibition and enforcement 
lower the marginal cost of violence, since evading apprehension for violent crime is 
complementary to evading arrest for trafficking in the illicit good (Miron and Zweibel, 
1995). 
This article explores the economic link between enforcement and violence in illicit 
markets.  We begin with the “textbook analysis”:2  enforcement, which is typically directed 
primarily at suppliers, raises opportunity costs by increasing risks for suppliers (Reuter 
and Kleiman, 1986) and shifts the supply curve up, and therefore raises prices.  When 
demand is inelastic, as it typically is estimated to be for goods like illicit drugs and tobacco, 
revenue rises with the market price (Becker, Murphy, and Grossman, 2006).  Given the 
reasons mentioned above that violence might increase with illicit revenue, greater 
enforcement therefore can have the unintended consequence of increasing violence.  The 
textbook analysis relies on straightforward arguments based on supply and demand, and 
the predictions are clear enough that many authors assume or assert that enforcement in 
black markets leads to more violence (e.g., Reuter and MacCoun, 1995).  The textbook 
                                                          
2 So named by Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor (2006), for example. 
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model of a competitive drug market lies at the heart of much applied policy research 
(Rydell and Everingham, 1994; Caulkins et al., 1997; Moore et al., 2005; Becker, Murphy, 
and Grossman, 2006).  
While higher revenue and violence are unintended consequences of enforcement, 
the experience of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s showed that there can be 
paradoxical outcomes as well.  That period was a time of greatly increased enforcement 
effort in the “War on Drugs” but also a time when the street prices of cocaine and heroin 
fell dramatically.3  That so much enforcement effort, which mostly targeted the supply 
chain, was coincident with sharply falling prices is therefore a puzzle.  The divorce between 
the theoretical predictions from the standard economic analysis and the reality on the 
streets sparked a vigorous effort among researchers to build models of black markets that 
exhibit paradoxical outcomes.  Some research in this vein suggests or develops models in 
which additional enforcement causes prices to fall or quantities consumed to rise (e.g., Lee, 
1993; Skott and Gepsen, 2002; Poret, 2003; Caulkins and Reuter, 2006; Jacobsson and 
Naranjo, 2009).  Others look specifically at violence, and construct economic models in 
which more enforcement reduces violence through non-price channels (Caulkins, Reuter, 
and Taylor, 2006).  The latter finding is (perhaps paradoxically, to non-economists) also 
paradoxical, given that the textbook economic analysis predicts that additional 
enforcement increases violence. 
                                                          
3 Cocaine prices for small users fell from about $450 per pure gram in 1981 to below $200 by 1994 (ONDCP, 
2001).  Prices largely remained low until 2007, when they began to rise again (UNODC, 2014).  Changes in the 
street price of heroin were less dramatic.  Heroin prices slid more slowly than cocaine prices during the 
1980’s but continued to fall through the subsequent decade.  From 1981 to 1998, annual federal expenditures 
aimed at reducing the use of illegal drugs through the criminal justice system, interdiction, and intelligence  
increased almost seven-fold (TRAC, 2000). 
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Therefore, on the one hand, the textbook analysis offers simple predictions about 
how enforcement affects prices, revenues, and violence, while on the other hand, the 
“paradoxical outcomes” literature seeks models that internally generate opposite 
conclusions.  In the textbook model, targeting supply for enforcement leads to a higher 
price and revenue, and therefore violence; there are no other issues complicating the 
simple analysis.  When the standard competitive model is replaced with models embodying 
different assumptions, which include downward-sloping supply curves (Caulkins and 
Reuter, 2006), imperfectly competitive vertically differentiated supply chains (Poret, 
2003), demand-side switching costs (Skott and Gepsen, 2002), market power over product 
demand characterized by contest success functions (Jacobssen and Naranjo, 2009), and 
enforcement that induces larger quantities per purchase (Lee, 1993), paradoxical outcomes 
instead are the result. 
We re-examine both the textbook model and the “paradoxical outcomes” literature.  
We also discuss an application to menthol cigarettes, which face an imminent ban in the 
European Union and possible bans in the United States and Canada.   We proceed in five 
steps, beginning with an examination of a model of a competitive illicit drug market.  We 
first show that the textbook model is in reality more nuanced than is often presented.  
Whenever enforcement creates risks for buyers as well as sellers, inelastic demand is a 
necessary but no longer a sufficient condition for revenue and violence to rise with 
enforcement.  When the demand curve itself moves, there is a countervailing demand-
shifting effect that can reduce revenue even when demand is inelastic.  Second, we derive a 
paradoxical outcome of our own:  when there are bandwagon effects in abiding by the law, 
even though each scofflaw creates a negative externality for society by discouraging others 
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from following the law, violence is less likely to rise with enforcement.  Third, we show that 
non-standard assumptions about the primitives of the market are not required for models 
of illicit markets to exhibit paradoxical outcomes.  In fact, the search for paradoxical 
outcomes is over almost before it begins; even the simplest noncompetitive models, 
monopolistic competition and Cournot oligopoly, lead to the literature’s “desired” 
paradoxical outcome that revenue and violence can fall with enforcement.  Fourth, we 
therefore argue that instead of searching for assumptions that lead endogenously to 
desired modeling outcomes, it is most helpful for analysis of public policy to choose 
appropriate assumptions for the basic model.  We finish with performing such an analysis 
for the current policy issue of banning menthol cigarettes.  Under the most plausible 
assumptions enforcement will indeed spur violence, although the legal availability of 
electronic cigarettes may mitigate or reverse this conclusion 
We proceed in the next section by examining the textbook model of an illicit market 
with two additional features, demand-side enforcement (which is sometimes omitted from 
the textbook analysis) and bandwagon effects among scofflaws.  In section II we show how 
the demand-shifting effect may reverse the typical textbook conclusions, and also show 
that bandwagon effects make such reversal more likely.  In section III we turn to a brief 
examination of three of the simplest models possible for illicit markets:  the textbook 
competitive market (the model from section II without the bandwagon effects), a 
monopolistically competitive market, and a Cournot oligopoly.  No more than these three 
models is necessary to generate the full range of outcomes from supply-side enforcement:  
it increases revenue and violence in the competitive market, has no impact in the 
monopolistically competitive market when all enforcement is against suppliers, and 
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decreases revenue and violence in the oligopolistic market.  In section IV, we return to 
competitive model and apply it to a potential prohibition on menthol cigarettes, showing 
that plausible choices for the parameters of the model imply that violence indeed increases 
with enforcement.   
II. A Competitive Illicit Market with Bandwagon Effects 
We present a relatively simple model of a black market characterized by 
enforcement action against trafficking in the good, violence driven by revenue in the 
market, and bandwagon effects among scofflaws.  Like Becker, Murphy, and Grossman 
(2006) and Reuter and Kleiman (1986), we assume the illicit market is competitive.  The 
model here is an extension of that examined in Prieger and Kulick (2014). 
A. The Model 
Consider a competitive market for an illicit drug.  Enforcement against trafficking in 
the good is a continuous variable, 𝑒 ≥ 0.  For analytical convenience, enforcement e is not 
differentiated according to the target (producer, importer, dealer, or user) and so 
represents total effort or money expended on law enforcement against trafficking.  We do 
not, however, assume that enforcement targets only one side of the market or that it affects 
both sides equally, as will be made clear below.   Instead, any difference in the amount of 
enforcement directed at the supply and demand sides is subsumed into the functions 
describing how total enforcement raises costs for suppliers and consumers.  Section A in 
the appendix formalizes this.  
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1. Supply 
Each homogeneous seller has a cost function 𝑐(𝑞𝑖) with derivative 𝑐
′(𝑞𝑖) ≥ 0 that 
represents the physical costs of procuring, processing, and distributing the good.  
Enforcement against the illicit market raises the effective cost of doing business by a 
multiple 𝜑(𝑒) ≥ 1.  These additional costs include the monetization of the perceived risks 
of arrest, sanction, fine, and incarceration, as well as any supply-disruptive activity 
following from enforcement, such as product seizure, as discussed in Reuter and Kleiman 
(1986).  The costs are created only by enforcement:  we assume that 𝜑(0) = 1 and 
𝑑𝜑 𝑑𝑒⁄ ≥ 0.  We typically expect that 𝜑 rises with enforcement; the case 𝑑𝜑 𝑑𝑒⁄ = 0 
pertains when enforcement is directed exclusively toward buyers.   
Marginal production costs for each firm i are therefore 𝜑𝑐′(𝑞𝑖), and the firm’s supply 
curve is 𝑞𝑆𝑖(𝑝𝑆) = 𝑘
−1(𝑝/𝜑), where 𝑘(𝑞) = 𝑐′(𝑞).4  Here, 𝑝𝑆 = 𝑝/𝜑 is the net price sellers 
receive after accounting for enforcement risk, and price 𝑝 is the monetary price exchanging 
hands in the market.  Summing the firms’ supply curves yields the market supply curve, 
𝑞𝑆(𝑝𝑆) = ∑ 𝑞𝑆𝑖(𝑝𝑆)𝑖 .  Denote the supply elasticity with 𝜂𝑆 = 𝑞𝑆
′ (𝑝𝑆) 𝑝𝑆 𝑞𝑆(𝑝𝑆)⁄ .  Defining 
𝜓 = 𝜑−1, the quantity supplied under enforcement is thus:  
𝑄𝑆(𝑝, 𝑒) = 𝑞𝑆(𝜓(𝑒)𝑝) (1) 
The properties of 𝜑 imply that 𝜓(𝑒) > 0, 𝜓(0) = 1 and  𝑑𝜓 𝑑𝑒⁄ ≤ 0.  
The impact of enforcement on the supply curve is illustrated in Figure 1.  With no 
enforcement, the supply curve is S0.  Enforcement raises costs by multiple 𝜑 to new supply 
                                                          
4 By identifying the supply curve with the inverse marginal cost curve, we ignore the breakeven profit 
constraint.  Either there are no fixed costs or the price is always above the level below which no firm wishes 
to produce. 
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curve S1.  Thus the quantity supplied at a price such as 𝑝′′ falls from 𝑞𝑆(𝑝
′′) to 𝑞𝑆(𝜓𝑝
′′), as 
marked in the figure. 
2. Demand 
In the absence of a ban, the market quantity demanded for the good is 𝑞𝐷, a 
downward-sloping function of the market price.  When the good is banned, there are two 
changes to demand.  First, we assume that a fraction ℓ ∈ [0,1] of consumers are law-
abiding, in the sense that, regardless of the street price of the banned good, they would 
never purchase any in an illicit market.  These consumers either switch to legal substitutes 
or cease consuming altogether.  We assume that the demand of these consumers is 
completely typical, so that after a ban the market demand curve for the illicit good is only 
(1 − ℓ) what it was before the ban.   
Unlike Becker, Murphy, and Grossman (2006), who assume that all enforcement is 
on the supply side, we also consider demand-side impacts.  As on the supply side, on the 
demand side we must also distinguish between the market price 𝑝 and the inclusive price 
consumers must pay, 𝑝𝐷.  If enforcement affects buyers, then the perceived inclusive 
expenditure on the product is higher than the transacted market price 𝑝 by a multiple 𝜌(𝑒).  
This “risk tax” on buyers acts like an expenditure tax of rate 𝜌 − 1.  We assume the risk tax 
satisfies 𝜌(0) = 1 and 𝑑𝜌 𝑑𝑒⁄ ≥ 0.  We typically expect that 𝜌 rises with enforcement; the 
case 𝑑𝜌 𝑑𝑒⁄ = 0 pertains only when enforcement is directed exclusively toward sellers.  
Thus ℓ reflects moral, religious, or social reasons for reduction in market demand, while 𝜌 
incorporates the direct impact of economic disincentives to consume, such as the expected 
legal consequences, to reduce demand. 
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Demand elasticity is 𝜂𝐷 = −𝑞𝐷
′ (𝑝𝐷) 𝑝𝐷 𝑞𝐷(𝑝𝐷)⁄ > 0, and, in keeping with much of the 
literature on addictive substances, demand is presumed to be inelastic: 0 ≤ 𝜂𝐷 < 1.  We 
justify this assumption for our application to cigarette markets below in section IV.  The 
quantity demanded at black market monetary price 𝑝, accounting for buyers’ risk from 
enforcement and the loss of the law abiders from the market, is: 
𝑄𝐷(𝑝, 𝑒) = (1 − ℓ)𝑞𝐷(𝜌(𝑒)𝑝) (2) 
There are bandwagon effects among scofflaws:  the more the illegal good is 
consumed in the market, the lower the fraction of consumers who abide by the law.5  The 
bandwagon effects may come from social considerations (“if everyone is breaking the law, 
why shouldn’t I?”) or the rational calculation that for any given amount of enforcement, the 
expected cost to the violator of detection and punishment of illegal activity must fall 
(Kleiman’s (1993) “enforcement swamping” effect).  We take fraction ℓ to be a downward 
sloping function of 𝑄𝐷, with lim𝑄𝐷→∞ ℓ ≥ 0 .  Thus equation (2) only implicitly defines 𝑄𝐷, 
since it enters the right side through  ℓ(𝑄𝐷). 
The impact of enforcement on the demand curve is illustrated in Figure 1.  With no 
enforcement, the demand curve is D0.  If ℓ  were identically zero, then enforcement raises 
costs by multiple 𝜌, shifting the demand curve in to D1.  When ℓ is nonzero as assumed 
above, then the demand curve shifts again to the left by amount ℓ𝑞𝐷, to D2.  The amount of 
the shift at any given price depends on  ℓ, which increases at quantity demanded increases.  
Thus, ℓ′ < ℓ′′ as drawn on the graph. 
                                                          
5 The terms bandwagon, herding, and demand externalities or spillovers are all used (sometimes 
interchangeably, sometimes not) in the literature for cases in which one consumer’s behavior directly affects 
the decisions of other consumers.  Becker, Murphy, and Grossman (2006) also endogenize demand for drugs 
in their model, but in a different way, by assuming that expenditures on persuading consumers to “just say 
no” reduces demand for the drugs. 
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3. Violence 
Since the insights of Goldstein (1985), it is common in models of illicit drug markets 
to assume that violence rises with illicit revenue R earned in the market.  We thus assume 
that violence can be measured with a function 𝑉 that is strictly increasing in R.  We set 
aside any direct beneficial effect of enforcement effort on violence (∂𝑉 𝜕𝑒⁄ = 0), since we 
model specific enforcement against trafficking and not general law enforcement against 
violent crime.   
B. The Impact of Enforcement on Violence 
Now we examine how prices, revenue, and violence change as enforcement activity 
increases.  
1. Impact on Market Price 
Define excess demand as 
𝐺(𝑝, 𝑒) = 𝑄𝐷(𝑝, 𝑒) − 𝑄𝑆(𝑝, 𝑒) (3) 
Then applying the implicit function theorem to the equilibrium condition 𝐺(𝑝, 𝑒) = 0 gives 
an expression for how the equilibrium price changes with enforcement: 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑒
= −
𝜕𝐺 𝜕𝑒⁄
𝜕𝐺 𝜕𝑝⁄
= 𝑝(−𝜔𝑆 𝜓
′ 𝜓⁄⏟      
supply-side
effect
  +   [−
𝜔𝐷 𝜌
′ 𝜌⁄
1 + ℓ′(𝑄𝐷)𝑞𝐷
]
⏟          
demand-side effect
 )  (4) 
where 𝜔𝐷 = 𝜂𝐷/(𝜂𝐷 + 𝜂𝑆), 𝜔𝑆 = 1 − 𝜔𝐷, and the elasticities are understood to be 
evaluated at the effective prices 𝜌𝑝 and 𝜓𝑝 (see appendix for proof).  As labeled, 
enforcement creates supply-side and demand-side effects. 
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The supply side effect  
The supply side effect is positive since 𝜓 is decreasing in 𝑒, assuming the supply 
curve does not slope down.   Enforcement raises costs on the supply side and shifts the 
supply curve up, increasing the equilibrium price.  This is the (only) outcome of the 
textbook model with supply-side enforcement only.  The decrease in quantity and the 
increase in price from the supply side effect in isolation is shown in Figure 1 with the 
movement from point A to point B on the graph. 
The demand side effect  
The demand side effect in expression (4) is negative.  We distinguish two cases.  
Case 1 applies when there are no bandwagon effects.  Without contagion among scofflaws, 
ℓ′ = 0 and so the demand-side effect is clearly negative.  This corresponds to the simple 
textbook case of enforcement shifting the demand curve down, so that the equilibrium 
price falls in response to demand-side enforcement.  In Figure 1, this corresponds to 
moving from point B to point C on the graph. 
Case 2 is for when the bandwagon effect is present.  However, we exclude the 
possibility that |ℓ′(𝑄𝐷)𝑞𝐷| ≥ 1, which would imply that the bandwagon effects are so 
strong that demand function 𝑄𝐷 slopes up in price.6  In this case, the demand-side effect in 
expression (4) remains negative.  However, since the denominator of the demand-side 
effect is smaller than in case 1, the bandwagon effect amplifies the demand-side effect.  The 
decrease in demand causes the quantity consumed to fall.  When scofflaws respond to total 
demand, some of them will “fall off the bandwagon,” ℓ rises, and total demand 𝑄𝐷 falls even 
                                                          
6 If ℓ′𝑞𝐷 is ever lower than -1, it can only be for a finite range of market quantity.  Fraction ℓ is bounded on 
both sides, and so its derivative cannot be large except in a local region.  In particular, ℓ′ must approach zero 
as 𝑄𝐷 becomes large enough.  Thus, we expect case 2 to be the usual case when there are bandwagon effects. 
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further.  The greater fall in quantity from the bandwagon effect is depicted in Figure 1.  
Starting from point B, the risk tax alone moves equilibrium from point B to point C, and 
then the bandwagon effect moves equilibrium further to point D. 
The total effect on price 
The sign of 𝑑𝑝/𝑑𝑒 is determined by the relative magnitudes of the demand- and supply-
side effects on price.  The appendix shows that the sign of the expression in (4) is positive, 
so that 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑒
> 0  ⇔   
𝜂𝐷𝜖𝜌
1 + ℓ′𝑞𝐷
< −𝜂𝑆𝜖𝜓  (5) 
where 𝜖𝑓 is the elasticity of function 𝑓 with respect to enforcement.  Both sides of the 
inequality on the right side of (5) are positive.  The left side captures the demand-side price 
sensitivity to changes in enforcement, while the right side reflects the supply side.  Whether 
the market price will increase with marginal increases in enforcement depends on the 
relative magnitudes involved.  Thus, when enforcement has demand-side effects in addition 
to those on the supply side, enforcement can lead to higher or lower prices.  The price 
effect of increased enforcement is ambiguous in general.  If demand is elastic enough, 
consumers are highly sensitive to enforcement risk, or bandwagon effects are strong 
enough, the demand-side effects can cause the market price to fall.  The opposite case is 
depicted in Figure 1, where moving from the initial, no-enforcement equilibrium at point A 
to the equilibrium with enforcement at point D increases the price. 
2. Impact on Revenue 
If the demand curve does not shift, and demand is inelastic as assumed, then the 
direction of the price change alone determines how revenue and violence change.  
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However, when the demand curve shifts downward in response to enforcement, there is a 
countervailing effect on revenue.  Equilibrium revenue can be written as 𝑅 = ?̂?𝑄𝐷(?̂?, 𝑒), 
where ?̂? is the equilibrium price given enforcement level 𝑒.  The total impact on violence of 
a marginal change in enforcement level is 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑒
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑒
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑅
[
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑒
𝑄 + ?̂? (
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑝
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑒
+
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑒
)]
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑅
[
 
 
 
 
(𝑄 + ?̂?
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑝
)
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑒⏟          
price effect
    + ?̂?
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑒⏟  
demand-shifting 
effect ]
 
 
 
 
 
(6) 
We have 𝑑𝑉 𝑑𝑅⁄ > 0 by assumption.  The first term in the brackets in the final expression 
in equation (6) is the price effect.  When enforcement rises, the price changes in accord 
with equation (5), which has a marginal impact on revenue.  The term in parentheses in the 
price effect is the usual marginal revenue term for an increase in price.  For the assumed 
inelastic demand, where 𝜂𝐷 < 1, this term is always positive: 
𝑄 + ?̂?
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑝
= 𝑄(1 − 𝜂𝐷) > 0 (7) 
 
Thus, with only supply-side enforcement, revenues changes in the same direction as price.  
This is usually assumed in the textbook analysis of illicit markets and violence.7   
However, the second term in equation (6), the direct impact of enforcement on the 
demand curve (the “demand-shifting” effect, or DSE), is negative whenever enforcement 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor (2006): “A standard argument in the analysis of drug markets is that 
when enforcement drives up the price of the drug, it also increases the revenues flowing to drug dealers if 
demand is inelastic.” 
14 
 
has any effect on consumers (so that 𝜖𝜌 > 0).  From implicit differentiation of equation (2), 
we can derive: 
𝐷𝑆𝐸 = ?̂?
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑒
= −
𝜂𝐷𝑅𝜖𝜌
𝑒[1 + ℓ′(𝑄𝐷)𝑞𝐷]
< 0 (8) 
where it is again assumed that bandwagon effects are mild enough that the expression in 
square brackets is positive (see the appendix for derivation).  This term is the offsetting 
effect on revenue of the demand curve shifting down in response to enforcement risk.  
Thus, even when the sign on the price change is clear from inequality (4), the total effect on 
revenue and violence is ambiguous.  If the DSE is great enough, revenue falls in response to 
a price increase even with inelastic demand.   
Note that the presence of bandwagon effects in demand can lead to a paradoxical 
result.  At first blush, bandwagon effects among scofflaws would appear to work against 
policymakers wishing to reduce consumption of the illicit good.  Each scofflaw creates a 
negative externality for society (assuming consumption is indeed socially harmful) by 
discouraging  others from following the law.  However, the existence of the bandwagon 
effect makes the DSE larger and therefore makes it easier for prices to fall.  Revenue and 
violence are therefore less likely to rise with enforcement when there are bandwagon 
effects. 
III. Three Simple Models Yielding All Possible Outcomes 
In this section, we compare the impact of enforcement on violence with three 
models of competition.  The results show that non-standard assumptions tailored to the 
unique characteristics of particular drug markets are not required to generate the full 
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range of outcomes regarding enforcement and violence.  For simplicity, and to make clear 
that the conclusions are not driven by any non-standard assumptions, here we assume all 
consumers are scofflaws.  If buyers care only about the direct economic incentives 
provided by consumption and risk, there is no bandwagon effect, and  ℓ = ℓ′ = 0. 
A. The Competitive Model without Bandwagon Effects 
Setting aside the bandwagon effect, the condition for the effect of enforcement on 
market price from (5) is: 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑒
> 0  ⇔   𝜂𝐷𝜖𝜌 < −𝜂𝑆𝜖𝜓  (9) 
Rearranging terms, this condition for a positive price change can be expressed as: 
𝜂𝐷
𝜂𝑆
< −
𝜖𝜓
𝜖𝜌
 (10) 
Recalling that 𝜖𝜓 < 0, it is thus sufficient for the market price to rise with more 
enforcement that 1) demand be less elastic than supply,  and 2) enforcement have more 
impact on the supply side than on the demand side, as measured by the impacts on risk-
adjusted prices given by the elasticity ratios on the right side.  The appendix shows that the 
latter condition holds when the proportion of enforcement directed at the demand side is 
small. 
The condition for the total effect of enforcement on revenue (the part inside the 
square brackets in equation (6)), expressed as a revenue elasticity, can be written as: 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑒
𝑒
𝑅
=  −𝜔𝐷(1 + 𝜂𝑆)𝜖𝜌   − 𝜔𝑆(1 − 𝜂𝐷)𝜖𝜓  (11) 
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(see the appendix), where 𝜔𝐷 and 𝜔𝑆 are as defined above after equation (4).  The first 
term is negative and the second term is positive if demand is inelastic.  This expression is 
positive if and only if  
𝜂𝐷𝜖𝜌  < −𝜂𝑆𝜖𝜓 (
1 − 𝜂𝐷
1 + 𝜂𝑆
) (12) 
Comparing this condition with inequality (10), we see that the condition for revenue and 
therefore violence to rise with enforcement is stricter than the condition for price to rise.8  
This is because the demand shifting effect in the revenue impact is always negative.  
Examination of condition (12) shows that inelastic demand is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for violence to rise with enforcement.  We therefore consider various market 
situations. 
1. Case 1: No direct enforcement on consumers 
If enforcement is focused entirely on suppliers and consumers are left alone, then 
𝜖𝜌 = 0, conditions (10) and (12) are satisfied.  Prices and violence both rise with 
enforcement effort.  This is the textbook analysis, depicted in Figure 1 with the movement 
from point A to point B. 
2. Case 2: The long run in a constant-cost industry 
In the long run in a competitive constant-cost industry the supply curve is 
horizontal.  With infinite 𝜂𝑆, inequality (10) is satisfied and greater enforcement of a ban 
leads to higher prices.  The limit of condition (12) as supply becomes infinitely elastic is 
𝜂𝐷
1 − 𝜂𝐷
 < −
𝜖𝜓
𝜖𝜌
 (13) 
                                                          
8 Conditions (10) and (12) differ only in the additional term on the right side in parentheses in condition   
(12).  If demand is inelastic and supply slopes up, the ratio composing the extra term is less than one. 
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which is easier to satisfy the more inelastic is demand or the higher the supplier-side 
enforcement elasticity is relative to the consumer-side enforcement elasticity.  As section A 
in the appendix shows, the ratio on the right side will be large when there is little demand-
side enforcement. 
3. Case 3: Completely inelastic demand 
If all consumers with any sensitivity to price (at least in the relevant range of market 
prices) have left the market, then the demand curve is vertical.  In the drug literature, it is 
sometimes assumed for simplicity that the hardest-core addicts have completely inelastic 
demand.9  Then since 𝜂𝐷 = 0, inequality (12) is satisfied and violence rises with 
enforcement. 
 
B. Monopolistic Competition 
If consumers in the black market do not in fact treat goods sold by different sellers 
as identical, then a model with market power on the part of sellers becomes appropriate.  
Perhaps the simplest such model is the monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977).  There is a continuum of sellers of measure 𝑛, with the quantity sold by seller 𝜄 
denoted 𝑞(𝜄).  The representative consumer likes variety, and views any two of the goods as 
equally substitutable.  A taste for variety may seem to be an odd assumption for black-
market drugs, in which many users cultivate exclusive relationships with dealers.  
However, given that sellers in drug markets often have geographical monopolies (their 
“turf”) and that buyers are geographically distributed, in the aggregate a taste for variety 
                                                          
9 However, in reality such addicts often spend nearly all their disposable income on drugs, as much as they 
can afford, instead of having a bliss point in consumption.  Refer also to Rasmussen and Benson (1994) for 
discussion on the assumption of perfectly inelastic demand for addictive drugs. 
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for the fictional representative consumer is appropriate.  In the most basic form of the 
monopolistic competition model,10 the utility of the representative consumer is 
𝑈 = 𝑞0
1−𝜇 [(∫ 𝑞(𝜄)𝑟𝑑𝜄
𝑛
0
)
1
𝑟
]
𝜇
 (14) 
where 𝑞0 is the outside good representing all purchases made outside the black market.  
Here, 𝑟 measures the substitutability between the goods of the black market sellers and 
parameter 𝜇 is between zero and one.  As in the perfect competition model, the monetary 
price of each good, 𝑝(𝜄), is marked up to include enforcement risk (if any) so that the 
consumer treats the price as being  𝜌(𝑒)𝑝(𝜄). 
While it is possible to solve for the profit-maximizing quantities offered for sale by 
each firm, the equilibrium price, and the resulting equilibrium revenue, the simple form of 
preferences in equation (14) makes the calculations unnecessary.  Given the Cobb-Douglas 
form of preferences for the outside good and the composite black market good defined by 
the expression within the square brackets of equation (14), it follows that parameter 𝜇 is 
the share of the consumer’s income 𝐼 spent on black market goods.  Since the risk tax from 
demand-side enforcement raises the effective price for the consumer to 𝜌𝑝, total 
expenditure (including the psychic “payment”) of 𝜇𝐼 yields total (monetary) revenue in the 
black market of only 𝜇𝐼/𝜌.11  Therefore the impact of enforcement on violence is: 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑒
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑒
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑅
(−
𝜇𝐼
𝜌2
𝜌′(𝑒)) = −
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑅
(
𝜇𝐼
𝑒𝜌
𝜖𝜌) ≤ 0 (15) 
                                                          
10 Although this form for the utility function is often called “Dixit-Stiglitz preferences,” Neary (2004) points 
out that Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) never analyzed such a simple form of utility, and so “Dixit-Stiglitz lite” is a 
better label. 
11 We assume that the compensation required by the consumer for bearing the black market risk is consumed 
through additional expenditure on the outside good, without explicitly incorporating this assumption into the 
utility function. 
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That is, violence falls when enforcement increases, as long as consumers are sensitive in 
any way to enforcement.  If there is no demand-side enforcement, then violence does not 
change at all when enforcement ramps up.  Supply-side enforcement plays no role in these 
results, for while raising cost on the supply side changes price, quantities, and profits in 
equilibrium (as well as the number of suppliers if entry is free), prices and total quantity 
purchased are offset in such a manner that revenue remains unaffected by the supply side. 
Under the assumption that all enforcement is on the supply side, therefore, the standard 
monopolistic competition model implies that enforcement has no effect on violence, 
regardless of the elasticity of demand.12 
C. Cournot Oligopoly 
Some authors use the Cournot oligopoly model of quantity setting to model 
imperfect competition in black markets (e.g., Chiu, Mansley, and Morgan, 1998; Poret, 
2003, 2009; Jacobsson and Naranjo, 2009).  In contrast to the monopolistic competition 
model, consumers view the goods sold by different sellers as perfectly substitutable.  On 
the supply side, sellers exercise market power and raise their profits by limiting the 
quantities they put on the market.  The restricted quantities drive the price up, raising 
profits for all sellers.  As opposed to the model of monopolistic competition, in which 
sellers choose a price for their goods and the quantity sold is determined by demand, a 
Cournot seller chooses an amount of product to put on the market and the price (common 
to all goods) is determined from inverse market demand for the total quantity produced.  
The notion of supply elasticity is meaningless in a market in which firms exercise market 
                                                          
12 Note, however, that the market power exercised by the firms ensures that prices are set so that demand for 
each good is in the elastic region. 
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power, because firms do not have a supply function.  Therefore the Nash equilibrium of the 
quantity-setting game must be found in order to derive a condition analogous to condition 
(12) for violence to rise with enforcement. 
Inverse market demand, from equation (2), is  
𝑃(𝑄, 𝑒) = 𝑓(𝑄)/𝜌(𝑒) (16) 
where 𝑄 = ∑𝑞𝑖  and 𝑓 = 𝑞𝐷
−1.  To guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium, we assume 
that the Novshek (1985) conditions are satisfied.13  In the symmetric Cournot model with 
undifferentiated demand, the profit function for each of 𝑛 firms is  
𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑒) = 𝑞𝑖𝑃(𝑄, 𝑒) − 𝜑(𝑒)𝑐(𝑞𝑖) (17) 
where as in the competitive model, 𝜑 is the cost multiple from enforcement risk and 𝑐 is the 
firm’s cost function.  Then the condition for the profit maximizing choice of quantity, 𝑞𝑖
𝑐, is  
𝑃(𝑄, 𝑒) − 𝜑𝑐′(𝑞𝑖
𝑐)
𝑃(𝑄, 𝑒)
=
𝑠𝑖
𝜌𝜂𝐷
=
1
𝑛𝜌𝜂𝐷
 (18) 
where 𝑠𝑖 is the seller’s market share, 𝑞𝑖
𝑐/𝑄.  This is the familiar Cournot markup condition 
(derived in the appendix), modified only by the introduction of enforcement risk.  The 
second equality follows from the symmetry of the Nash equilibrium.  Equation (18) 
implicitly defines the market quantity 𝑄𝑐 = ∑𝑞𝑖
𝑐 in equilibrium, from which the market 
price and revenue can be derived. 
Now examine how revenue varies with enforcement.  Since equilibrium market 
revenue is 𝑅(𝑄𝑐(𝑒)) = 𝑃(𝑄𝑐(𝑒), 𝑒)𝑄𝑐(𝑒), we have 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑒
=
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑄𝑐
𝑑𝑄𝑐
𝑑𝑒
=
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑄𝑐
(∑
𝑑𝑞𝑖
𝑐
𝑑𝑒
𝑛
𝑖=1
) (19) 
                                                          
13 We refer to the assumptions for Theorem 3 of Novshek (1985).  The most important of these is that 
marginal revenue is non-increasing in the aggregate output of other firms in the region of aggregate output 
where the market price is positive. 
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The first term is marginal revenue, which must be positive for the Cournot model; firms 
restrict quantity until demand is in the elastic range.  An expression for 𝑑𝑞𝑖
𝑐/𝑑𝑒 is derived 
in the appendix.  Putting the pieces together, under standard assumptions about the 
concavity of the profit function it can be shown that the condition for revenue to fall with 
enforcement is  
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑒
< 0  ⇔  −
𝜌′(𝑒)
𝜌(𝑒)
MR𝑖 < 𝜑
′(𝑒)𝑐′(𝑞𝑖
𝑐) (20) 
where MR𝑖 is marginal revenue for firm 𝑖.  However, since 𝜌
′ > 0, MR𝑖 > 0, 𝜑
′ > 0, and 
𝑐′ > 0, this condition is always satisfied.  Thus revenue, and therefore violence, always falls 
in the Cournot model when enforcement increases.  This result does not depend on the 
elasticity of supply or demand,14 and holds whether all enforcement is on the demand side 
(in which case the right side of the inequality in expression (20) is zero), all enforcement is 
on the supply side (in which case the left side of the inequality in expression (20) is zero), 
or enforcement is mixed. 
IV. Discussion and Application to Tobacco Control 
The examination of the simple models for competitive, monopolistically 
competitive, and oligopolistic markets in the previous section reveals that these three 
models cover all possible outcomes for the impact of enforcement on violence in illicit 
markets.  For example, consider the case in which all enforcement is on the supply side.  
The first model predicts unequivocally that revenue and violence increase with 
enforcement, the second yields the irrelevance result that there is no impact at all, and the 
                                                          
14 Keeping in mind, however, that the Cournot model only has a solution if an elastic region of demand can be 
found. 
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third predicts unequivocally that revenue and violence decrease with enforcement.  
Therefore one need not include non-standard assumptions about the workings of illicit 
drug markets to find any outcome, paradoxical or not.15   
Plausible reasons for the great decline of prices in major illicit drug markets in the 
last 35 years appear to be readily at hand without recourse to models of non-competitive 
markets or other departures from standard assumptions.  It is likely that improvements in 
crop yields have driven down the supply curve in illicit drug markets.  Given the illicit 
nature of the markets, hard data on production and supply-side costs are unavailable.  
However, some evidence suggests that the yields of illicit crops have increased 
dramatically.  For example, Mejía and Posada (2008) report that a UN study found that 
there was a 40% increase in the yields of coca (the raw ingredient for cocaine) per hectare 
in the early 2000’s.  In addition to the direct impact on the cost curves for cocaine, another 
benefit of increased productivity for producers of illicit crops is that supply can be grown 
on smaller plots of land, making aerial discovery and eradication by law enforcement more 
difficult.  The reduced risks of eradication further lower the cost curves.   Such exogenous 
changes in supply could easily negate or overwhelm the direct impact of enforcement on 
the supply curve.   
Furthermore, the presence of exogenous supply shifters does not change the basic 
message from the analysis of the competitive market above:  more enforcement still leads 
to more violence, ceteris paribus.  That fact that in reality other things were not held 
constant does not falsify the model or reduce its utility for policy analysis.  The competitive 
                                                          
15 This is not to say that examination of models closely tailored to the idiosyncrasies of particular drug 
markets, as suggested by Caulkins and Reuter (2006), is not fruitful for the better understanding of such 
markets. 
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model has two advantages for purposes of presenting policy analysis to policymakers.  
Given the widespread familiarity of the Marshallian cross among even non-economists, the 
reasoning behind the results can be readily understood by most policymakers.  This is the 
main reason that the textbook model is applied so often in policy research (Rydell and 
Everingham, 1994; Caulkins et al., 1997; Moore et al., 2005; Becker, Murphy, and Grossman, 
2006).  Furthermore, the prediction of the model that greater enforcement leads to more 
violence is in accord with nearly all of the empirical literature, as discussed in the 
introduction.  We now consider the competitive model’s predictions regarding violence 
resulting from enforcement of a ban on menthol cigarettes. 
Menthol cigarettes are facing possible prohibition by the FDA in the United States 
(Tavernise, 2013), an imminent ban in the European Union (Dalton and Esterl, 2013), and a 
current ban in Brazil.16  Menthol cigarettes constitute about one-third of the overall US 
cigarette market (O’Connor et al., 2012) and account for approximately $25 billion in 
annual retail sales (Esterl, 2011).  If menthol is banned in cigarettes, consumers will either 
quit tobacco altogether, switch to non-menthol cigarettes, switch to other mentholated 
tobacco products,17 or continue consumption illegally on the black market.  O’Connor et al. 
(2012) report that 25 percent of menthol smokers said they would “find a way to buy a 
menthol brand,” indicating their willingness to purchase menthol cigarettes on the black 
market.  Given the likely underreporting of illegal intentions, this estimate is probably 
understated, possibly to a large degree.  Tobacco-company representatives and industry-
                                                          
16 Other non-tobacco flavorings are prohibited in the United States under the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA) of 2009, but the law specifically exempted menthol.  The EU ban on menthol 
cigarettes will be fully in effect by 2020.  Brazil’s ban of menthol cigarettes was enacted into law in 2012 and 
took effect in 2013. 
17 These products may include menthol small cigars, which resemble cigarettes in most respects and which 
would not necessarily be banned along with menthol cigarettes (the FSPTCA, e.g., did not ban flavorings in 
small cigars), and menthol-flavored electronic cigarettes. We discuss the latter in the text below.   
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supported studies argue that severe negative impacts on public health, criminal activity, 
and tax revenues will ensue should a menthol ban pass, while anti-tobacco proponents 
contend that benefits to public health outweigh the possible social harms.18  In the 
remainder of this article we comment on the likely link between enforcement against 
trafficking in illicit menthol cigarettes and violence. 
To apply an economic model to cigarettes, four aspects of the market and model 
require consideration:  competition, the nature of enforcement, the elasticities involved, 
and the possibility of large exogenous shifts in supply.  Modeling the market as competitive 
appears to be appropriate, for several reasons.  Moeller and Hesse (2013) assert that low 
levels of enforcement tend to result in monopolistic markets, dominated by a few well-
organized suppliers.  The crackdown on tobacco smuggling in the United States, however, 
has had the opposite effect of shifting supply toward smaller enterprises.19  Furthermore, 
Reuter (1983) argues that concentration is unusual in illegal drug markets because 
pressure from law enforcement stimulates competition among suppliers.  Finally, any 
noncompetitive model requires that demand be in its elastic region, which does not appear 
to apply to illicit drug markets20 or (as will be noted below) the cigarette markets we 
consider here.  The assumption that demand for any single supplier’s product is elastic is 
defensible, and indeed is a feature in all three models considered here.21  However, the 
requirement that market demand in aggregate be elastic—as in the Cournot model—
                                                          
18 Refer to Hawken, Kulick, and Prieger (2013) for citations. 
19 Luk Joossens, a World Health Organization expert on tobacco smuggling, states that “the big companies 
know that to some extent the golden period of smuggling is gone. You have…a lot of small companies that are 
involved” (quoted in Guevara, 2008). 
20 Becker, Murphy, and Grossman (2006) note that estimated income elasticities for cocaine, marijuana, and 
heroin are generally well below one, tending toward 0.5.  See their study for citations. 
21 In a competitive market, demand for any one firm’s good is perfectly elastic by assumption.  In the models 
of monopolistic competition and Cournot oligopoly, profit maximization requires the demand facing each firm 
to be in its elastic region. 
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appears to be untenable.  For all these reasons, we adopt the competitive model for our 
policy analysis.  
We may expect that enforcement against trafficking in menthol cigarettes would 
follow the pattern set by current practice aimed at smuggled tobacco products, which is to 
target suppliers.  As with other illicit drug markets, nearly all enforcement effort is 
expended to disrupt supply in the market for illegal cigarettes.  While possession of illegal 
cigarettes is also a crime for buyers, law-enforcement agencies such as the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) typically focus their investigations on 
suppliers to reduce the incidence of organized crime (USDOJ OIG, 2009).  Furthermore, 
Miron and Zweibel (1995) argue that the supply-side effects of enforcement in illicit drug 
markets are likely to be much larger than the demand-side effects.   
Demand for smoking cigarettes is generally measured to be inelastic.  Chaloupka 
and Warner (2000) summarize the literature (after excluding a few outlying studies) as 
finding results in the relatively narrow band of demand elasticities between −0.3 and −0.5.  
More recent work by Chiou and Muehlegger (2008) also finds demand elasticities in the 
same inelastic range (−0.29 to −0.56).  For menthol cigarettes in particular, Tauras et al. 
(2010) conclude that “menthol and non-menthol cigarettes are not close substitutes” (p. 
121), based on an econometric estimate of the switching elasticity between the two.22  
Given that illegal menthol cigarettes would not be subject to the high taxes levied on legal 
                                                          
22 They calculate their estimated switching elasticity of −0.24 conditional on being a smoker.  While Tauras et 
al. (2010) do not estimate the other relevant parts of the inclusive demand elasticity—the extensive margin 
of the smoking-participation decision and the intensive margin of how many menthol cigarettes to smoke—
there is no reason to believe that the inclusive elasticity is greater than one.  Most of the studies cited by 
Chaloupka and Warner (2000) that find elasticity in the range −0.3 to −0.5 include both the extensive and 
intensive margins. Since the elasticities from each part of the demand process are additive (see Chiou and 
Muehlegger (2008) for a proof), even adding the switching elasticity of −0.24 (Tauras et al., 2010) keeps the 
elasticity range well within the inelastic region. 
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cigarettes, the illegal product may not be much more expensive—or may even be 
cheaper—than the legal substitute.  A small price increase (if any) and lack of close 
substitutes23 thus suggest that a ban on menthol cigarettes may not decrease demand for 
them much.24  We revisit the assumption regarding a lack of good substitutes below when 
discussing electronic cigarettes. 
What about bandwagon effects in illicit consumption?  There is a large but also 
largely unconvincing literature across the social sciences purporting to find peer effects in 
illicit drug use, smoking, drinking, and criminal behavior, typically among youths or college 
students.  However, until recently most studies did not adequately control for the severe 
self-selection problems inherent in such research.25  Duncan et al. (2005) draw on the 
natural experiment provided by random assignment of roommates in college dormitories 
to conclude that peer effects exist for binge drinking but not for marijuana use.  Sacerdote 
(2014) summarizes the best-designed recent studies on peer effects as suggesting that peer 
effects on social outcomes such as crime and drinking are larger than on educational 
achievement, but nevertheless cautions that not enough is yet known about peer effects to 
shape policy around them.  Almost nothing is known about peer or bandwagon effects 
among adults.  For these reasons, we set aside the bandwagon effect for our analysis and 
instead use the simpler competitive model from section III, although as more research 
                                                          
23 Home mentholization of regular cigarettes with oils or sprays is another substitute for purchasing menthol 
cigarettes.  However, we were unable to find any data on its prevalence. 
24 At least one other study looking specifically at demand for menthol cigarettes also comes to the conclusion 
that demand is relatively insensitive to price.  In a non-peer reviewed, econometric study funded by a tobacco 
company, Compass Lexecon (2011) finds that a 10 percent increase in the risk-inclusive effective price of 
illegal menthol cigarettes would be associated with a 1 percent decline in overall smoking, and that a 50 
percent increase in the price would reduce smoking by only 3.5 percent. 
25 Since one chooses one’s peers, unobserved factors may make an individual both more likely to engage in 
illicit activity and to enjoy the company of others who do likewise.  Thus, a large part of apparent “peer 
effects” may in fact be spurious. 
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becomes available on herding behavior and peer effects in illegal activity this may be a 
fruitful area of research to revisit. 
Inequality (10) shows that if, as argued above, enforcement has more impact on the 
supply side, then if demand is less elastic than supply the market price must rise with 
enforcement.  We have argued above that demand is relatively inelastic.  Supply is likely to 
be more elastic in cigarette markets, particularly in the long run, although estimates of 
supply elasticities are rarer than for demand.  There are no great diseconomies of scale in 
the tobacco-products industry, and the supply of unprocessed tobacco leaves is elastic.26  
Sumner and Wohlgenant (1985) found in a rigorous study of supply and demand 
conditions for cigarettes in the United States that “the derived supply curve for cigarettes is 
nearly horizontal” (p. 241), even when the domestic supply of raw tobacco is inelastic due 
to agricultural quotas.  Given the easy conversion from producing menthol to non-menthol 
cigarettes, it is quite likely that the supply function for menthol cigarettes is similarly 
highly elastic, or at the very least elastic relative to demand. 
Under these conditions—competitive markets, enforcement aimed mostly at the 
supply side, and more elastic supply than demand—the analysis in section III.A shows that 
violence increases with enforcement.  Under these conditions, the demand-shifting effect is 
small enough so that revenue and price both rise when enforcement increases.  Thus, we 
conclude that the social calculus regarding a ban on menthol cigarette should include the 
likelihood that enforcement will create violence in the market, and that higher levels of 
                                                          
26 Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) estimate the supply elasticity of tobacco without production quotas (which 
ended in 2004 in the United States) to be about 7.0.  Furthermore, the supply elasticity for tobacco may be 
expected to be “large, particularly in the long run, since tobacco uses a small proportion of the arable land in 
the world as well as in any country and the net return from growing tobacco is several times that from 
growing the next best alternative crops in many countries” (FAO, 2003, p.99). 
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enforcement will engender greater amounts of violence.  As with cocaine and heroin, 
exogenous supply shifters may confound this analysis.  However, radical exogenous cost 
reductions appear to be unlikely in the markets for illicit tobacco, since the crop is grown 
legally in the United States with well established, modern methods of farming, and would 
continue to be so after a ban on menthol cigarettes.  Crop yields of tobacco in the US grew 
an average of only 0.5% per annum from 1980 to 2012.27 
One important policy decision may change the conclusions of the analysis above.  
The growing market for the presently unregulated electronic cigarettes (“e-cigarettes”) 
poses interesting policy questions, and the FDA is currently deciding whether to regulate e-
cigarettes.28  E-cigarettes, which are currently unregulated, can also be mentholated.  If 
menthol e-cigarettes were not subject to the same usage restrictions as combustible 
cigarettes, the elasticity of demand for banned menthol cigarettes would likely rise in the 
presence of the substitute, because e-cigarettes create a user experience quite similar to 
that of combustible menthol cigarettes.  This might have two consequences.  Without a 
highly inelastic demand for the banned good, prices and revenues might not rise (or might 
not rise as much) in the illicit market, removing or attenuating the deleterious effect of 
enforcement on violence.  Furthermore, e-cigarettes can likely reduce the harm of smoking 
or provide an “exit ramp” from smoking altogether for some smokers.  Research on the 
health effects of e-cigarettes is ongoing, but the available evidence suggests that they are 
not as harmful to the smoker’s health as combustible cigarettes (Cahn and Siegel, 2011; 
                                                          
27 The figure is from authors’ analysis of data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, from faostat.fao.org/site/567/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=567.  
28 See NPRM in proceeding FDA-2014-N-0189 (79 FR 23141), April 25, 2014.  The FDA does, however, 
regulate e-cigarettes when marketed for therapeutic purposes. 
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Hajek et al., 2014).29  The relationship between an individual’s use of electronic and 
combustible cigarettes is also nascent, but some studies indicates that e-cigarettes may aid 
in cessation of smoking (Hajek et al., 2014; Biener and Hargrave, forthcoming).30  However, 
if the FDA were to regulate e-cigarettes or ban menthol e-cigarettes in addition to a ban on 
combustible menthol cigarettes, this potentially beneficial exit ramp will be closed. 
The unintended consequence of enforcement leading to violence does not, by itself, 
mean that menthol cigarettes (or any other drug) should not be banned.  A complete cost-
benefit analysis of a ban is beyond the scope of this paper.  Furthermore, if the good is 
banned, our conclusion does not imply that the optimal level of enforcement is zero.  
Optimal enforcement under simple assumptions has been considered by Becker, Murphy, 
and Grossman (2006) and Poret (2009).  However, Caulkins and Reuter (2010) and 
Feichtinger and Tragler (2001) contend that there are multiple equilibria to which the 
regulation/enforcement system may settle, due to path dependency.  Thus, the question of 
optimal enforcement may be much more complex than previous analyses have indicated. 
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Appendix 
A. Enforcement Targeting 
In the model, any differential between the impact of enforcement on suppliers and 
demanders is subsumed into the functions 𝜌 and  𝜓, so that we can think of the ratio 𝜖𝜓/𝜖𝜌  
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(as from inequality (13)) as being large when most of the enforcement is on the supply 
side.  The justification for this is provided here. 
Assume that fraction 𝛼 of total enforcement 𝑒 is directed toward the demand side, 
and define 𝑒𝐷 = 𝛼𝑒 to be the amount of demand-side enforcement.  Let ?̃?(𝑒𝐷) be the “risk 
tax” on buyers as a function of demand-side enforcement.  Then the risk tax function in the 
text is 𝜌(𝑒) = ?̃?(𝛼𝑒), and clearly the elasticity of ?̃? with respect to 𝑒𝐷 equals 𝜖𝜌.  Denote the 
former elasticity with  𝜖?̃?.  Assuming that the derivative of ?̃? is finite at 𝑒𝐷 = 0 and is 
continuous, 𝜖?̃? can be made arbitrarily small by making 𝛼 small, because 𝜖?̃? = 𝑒𝐷?̃?′(𝑒𝐷)/
?̃?(𝑒𝐷) and ?̃?(0) = 1 by assumption.  Thus, when few resources are devoted to demand-side 
enforcement, so that 𝛼 and 𝑒𝐷 are small, 𝜖?̃? and therefore 𝜖𝜌 are small. 
B. Perfect Competition Model 
Given the distinction between market and effective prices, two identities will be 
useful for the derivations to follow.  When evaluated at effective price 𝜌𝑝, we have 
𝜂𝐷(𝜌𝑝) = −𝜌𝑝𝑞𝐷
′ (𝜌𝑝)/𝑄𝐷 by definition of demand elasticity 𝜂𝐷 above. Hence, 
𝑝𝑞𝐷
′ = −𝜂𝐷𝑞𝐷/𝜌 (21) 
where 𝑞𝐷 and 𝑞𝐷
′  are understood to be evaluated at effective price 𝜌𝑝.  Similarly, we also 
have  
𝑝𝑞𝑆
′ = 𝜂𝑆𝑞𝑆/𝜓 (22) 
where 𝑞𝑆 and 𝑞𝑆
′  are evaluated at effective price 𝜓𝑝. 
Derivation of the DSE, equation (8) 
Define ?̂?𝐷(𝜌(𝑒)) and ?̂?𝐷(𝑒) to be the pre- and post-ban demand functions when 
treated as functions of 𝑒 alone, holding price fixed.  Total differentiation of the equation 
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?̂?𝐷 = [1 − ℓ(𝑄𝐷)]?̂?𝐷(𝜌(𝑒)),  yields 
𝑑?̂?𝐷 = −ℓ
′(?̂?𝐷)𝑑?̂?𝐷?̂?𝐷 + [1 − ℓ(?̂?𝐷)]?̂?𝐷′(𝑒)𝑝𝜌′(𝑒)𝑑𝑒 
Rearranging terms gives 
𝑑?̂?𝐷
𝑑𝑒
=
[1 − ℓ(?̂?𝐷)]𝑝?̂?𝐷′(𝑒)𝜌′(𝑒)
[1 + ℓ′(?̂?𝐷)?̂?𝐷]
 (23) 
Dropping the hats on 𝑄𝐷 and 𝑞𝐷 to allow 𝑝 to vary again, and therefore writing the 
derivative as a partial instead of a total allows  derivative (23) to be written as  
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑒
=
−(1 − ℓ)𝜂𝐷𝑞𝐷𝜖𝜌/𝑒
1 + ℓ′(𝑄𝐷)𝑞𝐷
 (24) 
where identity (21) and 𝜖𝜌 = 𝜌
′(𝑒)𝑒/𝜌 are used.  After substituting ?̂?𝐷 for (1 − ℓ)?̂?𝐷 in the 
numerator of the right side, and then substituting revenue 𝑅 for 𝑝𝑄𝐷, equation (8) for the 
DSE follows directly from equation (24) multiplied by 𝑝. 
Derivation of dp/de, equation (4) 
Using definitions (1) and (2), excess demand from equation (3) changes with price 
as: 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑝
= (1 − ℓ)𝑞𝐷
′ (𝜌𝑝)𝜌 − 𝑞𝑆
′ (𝜓𝑝)𝜓  (25) 
Using identities (21) and (22), this can be written 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑝
= (1 − ℓ)𝑞𝐷
′ (𝜌𝑝)𝜌 − 𝑞𝑆
′ (𝜓𝑝)𝜓  (26) 
Excess demand from equation (3) changes with enforcement as: 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑒
=
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑒
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑒
𝑞𝑆(𝜓(𝑒)𝑝) =
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑒
− 𝑞𝑆
′𝑝𝜓′  (27) 
Making use of equations (22) and (24), this is 
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𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑒
=
−(1 − ℓ)𝜂𝐷𝑞𝐷 𝜌
′ 𝜌⁄
1 + ℓ′𝑞𝐷
−𝜂𝑆𝑞𝑆 𝜓
′ 𝜓⁄    (28) 
Combining equations (26) and (28) via the implicit function theorem yields:  
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑒
= −
𝜕𝐺 𝜕𝑒⁄
𝜕𝐺 𝜕𝑝⁄
= −
−(1 − ℓ)𝑞𝐷𝜂𝐷 𝜌
′ 𝜌⁄
1 + ℓ′𝑞𝐷
−𝑞𝑆𝜂𝑆 𝜓
′ 𝜓⁄
−
(1 − ℓ)𝑞𝐷𝜂𝐷
𝑝 − 𝑞𝑆𝜂𝑆/𝑝
   (29) 
Using equations (1) and (2) and recognizing that 𝑄𝐷 = 𝑄𝑆 in equilibrium transforms (29) 
into: 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑒
= 𝑝
𝜂𝐷 (
−𝜌′ 𝜌⁄
1 + ℓ′𝑞𝐷
)−𝜂𝑆 𝜓
′ 𝜓⁄
𝜂𝐷 + 𝜂𝑆
   (30) 
With  𝜔𝐷 = 𝜂𝐷/(𝜂𝐷 + 𝜂𝑆) and 𝜔𝑆 = 1 − 𝜔𝐷, equation (30) can be written as in equation (4). 
Derivation of the condition for dp/de>0, inequality (5) 
The denominator of (29), 𝜕𝐺 𝜕𝑝⁄ , is clearly negative if supply does not slope up. 
Therefore the sign of (29) is the same as the sign of the numerator 𝜕𝐺 𝜕𝑒⁄ . Using equations 
(1) and (2) and recognizing that 𝑄𝐷 = 𝑄𝑆 = 𝑄 in equilibrium transforms equation (28) into 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑒
= (
−𝜂𝐷 𝜌
′ 𝜌⁄
1 + ℓ′𝑞𝐷
−𝜂𝑆 𝜓
′ 𝜓⁄ )𝑄  (31) 
Converting the enforcement cost function expression to elasticities and dividing by 𝑄, we 
see that (31) has the same sign as 
−𝜂𝐷𝜖𝜌/𝑒
1 + ℓ′𝑞𝐷
−𝜂𝑆𝜖𝜓/𝑒  
Dividing by 𝑒, we arrive at condition (5). 
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Derivation of the revenue effect without bandwagon effects, equation (11) and 
inequality (12) 
The revenue effect of a price change, from (6), is 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑒
= (𝑄 + ?̂?
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑝
)
𝑑?̂?
𝑑𝑒
+ ?̂?
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑒
= −𝑅(1 − 𝜂𝐷) (
𝜔𝐷𝜌
′
𝜌
+
𝜔𝑆𝜓
′
𝜓
) − 𝜂𝐷𝑅𝜖𝜌 (32) 
where equations (4), (7), and (8) are used for the latter equality.  Using elasticities for all 
expressions involving derivatives yields: 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑒
𝑒
𝑅
= −(1 − 𝜂𝐷)(𝜔𝐷𝜖𝜌 + 𝜔𝑆𝜖𝜓) − 𝜂𝐷𝜖𝜌 (33) 
After combining the terms involving 𝜖𝜌, equation (11) follows.  Inequality (12) follows 
directly from multiplying the right side of equation (11) by (𝜂𝐷 + 𝜂𝑆). 
C. Cournot Model  
Derivation of FOC for profit maximization 
Define 𝑅𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) = 𝑞𝑖𝑓(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞−𝑖)/𝜌 as revenue for firm 𝑖, where 𝑞−𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  and 
inverse demand is from equation (16).  From the profit function (17), the first order 
condition for profit maximization given 𝑒 is: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑒)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
=
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
− 𝜑(𝑒)𝑐′(𝑞𝑖) = 0 (34) 
where under the Nash assumption that other sellers’ quantities are invariant to changes in  
𝑞𝑖 we have 
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= 𝑀𝑅𝑖 = 𝑤[𝑓(𝑄) + 𝑞𝑖𝑓′(𝑄)] = 𝑃 + 𝑞𝑖𝑓′(𝑄) (35) 
In the expression, for convenience 𝑤 = 1/𝜌.  From the inverse function theorem and 
equation (21), 𝑓′(𝑄) = −𝑃 𝑤𝜂𝐷𝑄⁄ , and so we have 
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𝑀𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃 (1 −
𝑞𝑖
𝑄
𝑤
𝜂𝐷
) = 𝑃 (1 − 𝑠𝑖
𝑤
𝜂𝐷
) (36) 
Combining (34) and (36) yields  
𝑃 (1 − 𝑠𝑖
𝑤
𝜂𝐷
) − 𝜑(𝑒)𝑐′(𝑞𝑖) = 0  ⟺  
𝑃 − 𝜑𝑐′
𝑃
= 𝑠𝑖
𝑤
𝜂𝐷
 (37) 
from which the Cournot markup condition (18) readily follows.  Incidentally, the equation 
on the left side of (37) also shows that 𝑀𝑅𝑖  must be positive. 
Derivation of dqic/de and dR/de, expression (20)  
To derive 𝑑𝑞𝑖
𝑐/𝑑𝑒, first write the first order condition (34) as:  
𝑃(𝑄, 𝑒) − 𝜑𝑐′ + 𝑞𝑖
𝑐 𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑄
= 0 (38) 
 
Then apply the implicit function theorem to equation (38) to yield:  
𝑑𝑞𝑖
𝑐
𝑑𝑒
=
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑒 − 𝜑
′𝑐′ + 𝑞𝑖
𝑐 𝜕
2𝑃
𝜕𝑄𝜕𝑒
−(𝑛 + 1)
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑄 + 𝜑𝑐
′′ − 𝑞𝑖
𝑐𝑛
𝜕2𝑃
𝜕𝑄2
 (39) 
Under standard assumptions for the existence of Cournot Nash equilibrium, discussed 
below, the denominator of equation (39) is positive and the sign of 𝑑𝑞𝑖
𝑐/𝑑𝑒 is determined 
by the numerator.    Recall that 𝑤 = 𝜌−1.  Then, since from (16) we have 𝑃(𝑄, 𝑒) =
𝑤(𝑒)𝑓(𝑄), the numerator of (39) is 
𝑤′𝑓 − 𝜑′𝑐′ + 𝑞𝑖
𝑐𝑤′𝑓′ =
𝑤′
𝑤
[𝑤(𝑓 + 𝑞𝑖
𝑐𝑓′)] − 𝜑′𝑐′ =
𝑤′
𝑤
𝑀𝑅𝑖 − 𝜑
′𝑐′ =
𝜌′
𝜌
𝑀𝑅𝑖 − 𝜑
′𝑐′ (40) 
In equation (19), we know that the marginal revenue term (defined in equation (35)) is 
positive and 𝑑𝑞𝑖
𝑐/𝑑𝑒 is the same for all sellers because of symmetry.  Therefore, the 
40 
 
condition that 𝑑𝑅 𝑑𝑒⁄ > 0 is the same as the condition that equation (40) is greater than 
zero, hence inequality (20). 
Above it was claimed that the denominator of equation (39) is positive, which is to 
say that 
(𝑛
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑄
− 𝜑𝑐′′) + (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑄
+ 𝑄𝑐
𝜕2𝑃
𝜕𝑄2
) < 0 (41) 
The first term in parentheses is negative if demand slopes down and cost is weakly 
convex.31  The second term in parentheses is non-positive under assumption (3) of 
Novshek (1985), which he shows is equivalent to the assumption that each firm’s marginal 
revenue is not increasing in 𝑞−𝑖 (see footnote 13).  Thus follows the inequality. 
  
                                                          
31 Assuming that the cost function is convex is stronger than required for the Novshek (1985) assumptions, 
but is nevertheless a common assumption in the literature. 
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